ABSTRACT Software Defined Networking (SDN) is a new networking paradigm with the promise to increase simplicity and efficiency in network management through the separation of control functions from the forwarding functions. In SDN, the control functions are softwarized and logically placed in a centralized entity, i.e. the SDN controller. Network virtualization is one of the key features enabled and facilitated by the SDN, and it allows multiple virtual networks and the SDN controllers to share the same physical network infrastructure. This paper discusses the security of virtualization in the SDN, and it highlights and demonstrates critical vulnerabilities of key network hypervisors used in the SDN. In particular, the paper demonstrates how the isolation of different virtual networks can be broken, and enabling different types of attacks. Finally, the paper discusses the potential impact of these vulnerabilities and points to mitigation approaches.
A key requirement of NV in regards to security is the maintenance of isolation of the different virtual networks [13] , [14] . An attacker on one virtual network should not be able to bypass the virtualization layer (hypervisor), and interact with and possibly disrupt nodes or controllers on other virtual networks. This is similar to the corresponding requirement in compute virtualization [15] , which has been widely studied.
This paper aims to provide an initial exploration of network virtualization security in SDN that so far has received very limited. In particular, we consider FlowVisor [16] and OpenVirteX (OVX) [17] , the two most relevant SDN hypervisor platforms commonly deployed in network test-beds, e.g. OFELIA [18] , GENI [19] , FITS [20] , etc. We consider these network hypervisors together with key SDN controller platforms such as Ryu [21] , ONOS [22] and Floodlight [23] .
Our exploration identifies a number of significant security vulnerabilities in the current implementation of SDN hypervisors, which are either due to design flaws or implementation bugs. A further contribution is the practical demonstration of the feasibility of the attacks, and an evaluation of their potential impact.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview on the current state-of-the-art of network virtualization mechanisms in SDN. Section III presents a classification of security threats towards network virtualization in SDN, and Section IV discusses related works. Section V briefly presents our experimental platform. Section VI and Section VII describe the vulnerabilities of current SDN hypervisors, i.e. FlowVisor and OpenVirtex respectively, and demonstrate a number of potential attacks. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SDN HYPERVISOR PLATFORMS A. FLOWVISOR
The first OpenFlow-based hypervisor platform that provides virtualization for SDN is FlowVisor [16] , which uses a typical multi-tenancy technique that enables multiple SDN controllers to share the hardware resources of a particular physical infrastructure. FlowVisor allows virtualization of bandwidth, topology, traffic, device CPU and forwarding tables, with no modification applied to the control plane and the data plane. FlowVisor acts as a proxy between forwarding elements and controllers and is, therefore, able to inspect and rewrite all OpenFlow messages sent between the control plane and the data plane. In this way, it can enforce isolation of the different network slices and can make sure that packets stay within their configured virtual networks. The key virtualization mechanism in FlowVisor works via the slicing of the flow space, which is made up of the OpenFlow packet header bits. Therefore, slicing can be done based on IP addresses, MAC addresses, VLAN tags, etc. Figure 1 illustrates the general FlowVisor architecture. The bottom layer, i.e. Slicing Policies, allocates a fraction of link bandwidth, network topology and number of forwarding entries per slice, and ensures no slice monopolizes the entire hardware resources. The layer also determines where to forward a packet based on a set of flow rules, i.e. the flow space. At the top of the FlowVisor architecture is the logic abstraction layer, which presents a logical copy of routers and switches, i.e. a virtually sliced network to each of the different tenant controllers, configured individually based on information provided by the Slicing Policies layer.
Upon receiving an OpenFlow message from an SDN controller, FlowVisor parses the packet header and makes a policy check to decide which slice the message belongs to. In this process, FlowVisor also verifies that the flow definition of the message is within the allocated flow space of the sender tenant. Packets are generally rewritten and forwarded to adhere the slice policy. For example, if slicing is done using VLAN tags, a packet sent from a controller will be modified, and the corresponding VLAN tag will be set. One of the limitations of OpenFlow is that it only supports network slices with disjoint flow spaces.
B. OPENVIRTEX
OpenVirteX (OVX) [17] is a network hypervisor that takes virtualization in SDN a step further. Similar to FlowVisor, it acts as a transparent proxy between OpenFlow switches and SDN controllers. The key improvement of OVX over FlowVisor is that it supports full flow space virtualization, which means it supports multiple slices with overlapping flow spaces, e.g. IP and MAC address range, VLAN ID, etc.
OVX assigns each virtual network a global unique identifier, i.e. an ID (tenant ID) for each tenant. Instead of allocating packets based on flow space matching, the key limitation of FlowVisor, OVX places a new functionality at SDN edge switches, that explicitly rewrites the header fields of incoming packets into its own, unique format. This rewriting is reversed when packets are sent to the respective destination slices, i.e. hosts or controller.
The OVX architecture consists of two logical layers, OVX virtual networks and OVX physical networks, as shown in Figure 2 . The OVX virtual networks layer provides tenants with a completely isolated virtual network, consisting of virtual switches and links. As a result, each tenant can specify its own, unique virtual network topology.
The OVX physical networks layer provides a network topology, equivalent to the physical infrastructure and maintains the mapping of OpenFlow messages between OVX and the data plane. The information that allows this bridging is maintained in the OVXMap, which also records the (tenant IDs) to track the state of the OVX physical networks (e.g. network topology) and correspondingly updates the OVX virtual networks.
Upon receiving a packet via an OpenFlow message from an SDN controller, OVX parses the packet and maps it to the corresponding tenant ID. It then re-writes the header fields to maintain the isolation between the different virtual networks. When OVX receives a message from an SDN switch, it uses the tenant ID to determine the corresponding virtual network, and therefore how the packet is to be handled [17] .
The key difference between OVX and FlowVisor lies in the flexibility of the topology customization and addressing scheme, which has implications for traffic isolation. By leveraging OVX, each tenant is provided with a fully virtualized network and is free to implement the desirable VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. OpenVirteX architecture.
topology regardless of the physical topology, and choose any addressing scheme for their hosts, regardless if there is an overlap with other virtual networks. In contrast, in FlowVisor, tenants are only allowed to specify a topology that is isomorphic to the actual physical network topology. The entire flow space is essentially sliced into non-overlapping flow spaces.
In this paper, we focus on the security of FlowVisor and OVX, since they are the most relevant and widely used SDN hypervisors, and form the basis of a range of other hypervisors. In the following section, we briefly discuss some of the these other SDN hypervisor proposals.
C. OTHER SDN HYPERVISOR PLATFORMS
VeRTIGO [24] extends the network slicing techniques of FlowVisor and introduces additional abstraction features to improve and overcome FlowVisor's limitations. With VeRTIGO, each SDN controller basically operates on a disjoint subset of network elements and is provided with a logical representation of the physical topology. Therefore, the full virtual network which includes virtual links and nodes is presented to the SDN controller.
Advanced FlowVisor (ADVisor) [25] is a further extension of FlowVisor that mainly relies on the tag-based virtualization to distinguish between tenants. OpenFlow switches are programmed to add the VLAN ID for traffic entering the network.
Similarly, the FlowN architecture [26] is proposed to improve the tag-based virtualization. FlowN is a container-based virtualization that communicates directly with the tenant controller over a special OpenFlow API, rather than the OpenFlow protocol. Instead of simultaneously running multiple SDN controllers, FlowN allows only one SDN controller with multiple containers to share the kernel space with independent namespaces. Based on the VLAN ID, FlowN virtualizes the physical network infrastructure and allows tenants to specify the addressing scheme and the network topology. FlowN tags traffic entering the network with the VLAN ID and removes the VLAN ID when traffic leaves the network. The key benefit of FlowN is that the mapping of OpenFlow messages traversing the control channel between the physical and virtual networks is no longer required, resulting in the reduction of memory and computational overhead.
AutoSlice [27] is an SDN virtualization layer that distributes the functionality of the hypervisor through the segmentation of the physical infrastructure into multiple SDN domains. Each SDN domain includes a controller proxy to essentially manage the OpenFlow messages between the SDN controller and switches. To optimize network resource utilization, AutoSlice dynamically assigns virtual sources to each separate SDN domain.
AutoVFlow [28] is an extension of AutoSlice that grants the tenants of wide-area networks full control of their own virtual SDNs. In contrast to AutoSlice, where the flow space is shared, and controller tenants are restricted to the permissible header values of data packets, AutoVFlow provides each controller proxy of each SDN domain with the ability to freely utilize the entire flow space, similar to OpenVirteX, hence allowing overlapping flow spaces.
III. SDN VIRTUALIZATION VULNERABILITIES
Most security vulnerabilities in software systems arise from either improper design or implementation bugs, i.e. software flaws, due to the fact that the system designer and the software programmer are humans and can make mistakes [29] . As a result, attackers can readily exploit the software bugs and produce unpredictable inputs to modify the system behavior as desired. Despite the fact that Heartbleed [30] , the most impactful security bug in OpenSSL's history, was simple and uncomplicated to remediate, the impact was extremely severe. In general, software flaws are notoriously difficult to discover and are often the root cause of major system disruptions and outages. Therefore, writing bug-free and reliable software remains a critical challenge [31] . Due to the 'softwareization' of networks in SDN, the problems of software design and implementation flaws have become an increasingly critical security threat in SDN. In particular SDN controllers are complex software systems, with a significant potential for flaws and bugs.
In virtualized SDNs, the network hypervisor appears as a controller to the data plane and as forwarding elements to the control plane, which in this case represents a single point of failure. By successfully attacking the SDN hypervisor, an attacker can disrupt or potentially bring down the entire network, including all virtual networks controlled by different tenants. This provides a key motivation for the work presented in this paper. Table 1 provides a brief summary with representative examples of threat categories applied to the SDN virtualization layer. It is apparent from the table that the attacker can masquerade and falsify packets information of other tenants running on a completely separate network by breaking the isolation mechanism. As a result, we believe that applying an effective and efficient testing mechanism to any SDN controller platforms is crucial and should be conducted through the software development life cycle. For our security analysis of SDN hypervisors, we used a combination of code analysis and fuzz testing [32] .
IV. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we summarize the most relevant work in the area of network virtualization security in the SDN context. We only found a very limited number of works which specifically consider the security of current SDN hypervisor platforms.
The authors of [33] briefly mention potential vulnerabilities in FlowVisor that can violate the isolation mechanism through the VLAN ID and rewriting fields. The proposed solution is an independent extension of FlowVisor, which basically limits the number of actions supported in the OpenFlow protocol. The paper does not provide clear technical details on how the VLAN ID and rewriting fields can break the isolation mechanism, as provided in our paper. The paper also does not discuss or evaluate the impact of those vulnerabilities, nor does it investigate other vulnerabilities in FlowVisor.
The authors of [34] mention a potential attack against FlowVisor, where it is assumed that an administrator configures virtual networks with overlapping flow spaces. The 2-page paper lacks detail and does not provide an evaluation of the potential impact of the attack.
Existing work on the security analysis of FlowVisor is very limited. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work on vulnerability assessment of OpenVirteX.
V. EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM
For all our experiments discussed later in this paper, we used Mininet [35] and Open vSwitch (OVS) [36] . The standard network topology used in our experiments consists of three OpenFlow switches with two hosts attached to each switch, as shown in Figure 3 . Each host is assigned to a different virtual network. We used FlowVisor and OVX as our SDN hypervisors to provide isolation that allows two tenants, Tenant 1 and Tenant 2, to run two virtual networks in parallel, i.e. Virtual Network 1 and Virtual Network 2, over the same physical network infrastructure. Each virtual network runs its own tenant controller.
The SDN controller platforms we chose to run on top of Virtual Network 1, i.e. Tenant 1 are Ryu [21] , ONOS [22] , and Floodlight [23] , with their respective default forwarding applications, simple_switch in Ryu, fwd in ONOS and forwarding in Floodlight. We further used netcat [37] , a basic and versatile network tool that we used for collecting traffic information. Table 2 summarizes the relevant software tools we used for our experiments.
All our experiments were conducted on a Dell server (PowerEdge R320 with a 12-core Xeon E5-2400 CPU and 32GB of RAM), running Ubuntu Linux 17.10 with kernel version 3.16.0. To minimize interference, we allocated each key process (ovs-switch, controllers, FlowVisor, OVX) to a dedicated CPU core. The following sections present our results and a demonstration of the feasibility of attacks using the identified vulnerabilities in FlowVisor and OVX.
VI. SECURITY OF FLOWVISOR
By analyzing the source code of FlowVisor and using fuzz testing, we discovered previously unknown security vulnerabilities that make the system susceptible to various attacks. In the following, we discuss these vulnerabilities and demonstrate how they can be exploited.
A. TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY
FlowVisor discovers the topology of the physical network infrastructure via utilizing the OpenFlow Discovery Protocol (OFDP) and builds its own link database based on the information provided in the corresponding Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) packets, which are the control packets used in the topology discovery process. FlowVisor relies on this database to provide tenant controllers with the underlying topology. It precludes any SDN controller from having its own topology discovery component directly retrieving the topology information of the physical network. For example, when a tenant controller runs its own topology discovery service, FlowVisor intercepts the controller's LLDP packets, and creates LLDP packets in reply, in order to 'emulate' the virtual topology that this controller is supposed to see.
The format of the LLDP frame used in FlowVisor is similar to the original LLDP format, described in [38] , except that FlowVisor adds a trailer to its own LLDP packets as shown in Figure 4 . The trailer consists of two new fields, the first one carries the ''FlowVisor'' name and the second one carries the ''Slice'' name, to distinguish between LLDP packets generated by FlowVisor and LLDP packets generated by SDN controllers running their own topology discovery. The basic security problem with the current implementation of OFDP is that it is fundamentally insecure due to the lack of any authentication and integrity protection mechanism [38] .
The trailer that FlowVisor adds to the LLDP packets does not add any security mechanism, and hence any LLDP packet with a trailer is accepted by FlowVisor for processing. The information provided in the packet is used to update FlowVisor's link database. As a consequence, it is relatively easy for an attacker to inject a fabricated LLDP packet, resulting in a poisoning of the topology information of the FlowVisor database.
The method of the attack is essentially the same as the one discussed in [38] , but the key difference here is that we are attacking the SDN hypervisor, instead of the SDN controller. As a result, all virtual networks and tenants are impacted by the attack and are presented with invalid network topology information.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the attack, we used the virtual network test-bed and the network topology described in Section V. For this example scenario, FlowVisor is configured to slice the network based on the VLAN ID. In this case, we have two virtual networks, Virtual Network 1 with VLAN ID 100, and Virtal Network 2 with VLAN ID 200, and each virtual network runs its own ONOS SDN controller instance.
For this experiment, we assume that the attack is initiated by host h2, which injects an LLDP packet with the structure shown in Figure 4 , aiming to fabricate a fake link from switch S1 on port P2, and switch S3 on port P1.
As mentioned, the attack steps are quite similar to the attack discussed in [38] , except that we need to include the relevant FlowVisor LLDP trailer, i.e the ''magic flowvisor1'' and ''fvadmin'' fields as shown in Figure 5 .
When the LLDP packet arrives at switch S1, which adds its own Chassis ID and Port ID according to its pre-defined rule, it forwards the packet to the controller, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-In message. FlowVisor intercepts the packet and updates its links database based on the information provided in the payload of the received LLDP packet. Figure 6 shows the FlowVisor link database after launching the attack. 1 Each group represents detailed information, e.g. source and destination of ports and switches of a unidirectional link. For example, the first line (in bold) indicates that there is a unidirectional link between switch S3 on port P1 and switch S1 on port P2. Looking at Figure 3 , we can see that such a link does not exist. Hence, the attack has been successful. This is the network information that FlowVisor will provide to all its tenant controllers when they query the network topology, resulting in a poisoning of all controllers' topology information. The potential impact of this has been discussed in detail in [38] .
B. BREAKING ISOLATION
Another security problem with the current design of FlowVisor is that there is no detailed security check implemented to investigate the content of the packets sent from a tenant controller to a switch in the form of OpenFlow packets. In particular, FlowVisor fails to properly check the OpenFlow actions (action list) associated with the packets, which results in appending those actions into the forwarding table of the switch.
One of the actions supported by OpenFlow is 'set-field', which grants OpenFlow-enabled devices direct access to the header fields of a packet, resulting in the ability to overwrite selected fields with arbitrary values [39] . An attacker can easily expose this action and manipulate the packet fields to redirect network traffic to another virtual network. This is particularly simple if the network is sliced based on VLAN IDs, which the attacker can alter by adding a set_VLAN ID action to a match rule.
To experimentally demonstrate this vulnerability, we used the same network scenario as mentioned above. We assume that the attack comes from Virtual Network 2 (Tenant 2), and the aim is to break FlowVisor's isolation and inject network traffic into Virtual Network 1 (Tenant 1).
The attack can be broken down into the following steps:
1) Controller C1 initially installs an OpenFlow rule with a high priority on all switches, switch S1, switch S2 and switch S3, to match on the VLAN ID of 200, which explicitly matches all packets sent by any host belonging to its own network, i.e. Virtal Network 2. The corresponding action list associated with this rule includes two actions: (1) set the VLAN ID to 100, and (2) forward the packet to the controller. In this case, all packets traversing through Virtual Network 2 are redirected to the controller C0 of Virtual Network 1.
2) The attacker now needs to generate traffic, either from a host (h2, h4 or h6), or from the controller C1. For our experiment, we assume that the attack is generated via the controller, by injecting ARP packets encapsulated in OpenFlow Packet-Out messages, with different sending rates. The problem with this scenario is that the OpenFlow rule installed previously to modify the VLAN ID is not executed, and hence the packet is treated according to the action list associated with this packet. The simple solution to this is to set the action of the output port to OFPP_TABLE, which allows the switch to handle the packet as if it was received via any of the switch's regular ports, and processes the packet according to the rules in its forwarding table. In this case, we can ensure that the involved switches rewrite the VLAN ID from 200 to 100, and then send the packet to the controller. 3) FlowVisor receives the packet, and based on the VLAN ID, it forwards the packet to the switches S1, S2 and S3. Each switch receives a copy of the packet and performs the actions as specified in the forwarding table, which includes modifying the VLAN ID from 200 to 100 and sending the packet back to the controller, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-In message. 4) FlowVisor receives three OpenFlow Packet-In messages and checks the VLAN ID to know where to forward the packets to, either Virtual Network 1 or Virtual Network 2. Since the VLAN ID is 100 and FlowVisor is unable to detect the VLAN ID modification, the packets are forwarded to Virtual Network 1, and hence the attack is successful.
Being able to direct traffic to a controller of a foreign virtual network can be used for DoS attacks. To quantify the impact of such an attack, we consider the CPU load on the target controller C0, caused by processing the DoS packets, i.e. the process of parsing received OpenFlow Packet-In messages, generated by the malicious controller C1, as well as transmitting the corresponding OpenFlow Packet-Out messages. Figure 7 shows the CPU load of the controller under attack, as a function of the attack sending rate, ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 pkts/s. We repeated the experiment for three SDN controller platforms, i.e. Ryu, ONOS and Floodlight, and the corresponding CPU load values are shown in the graph. In addition, the graph also shows the CPU load for FlowVisor. All experiments were repeated 15 times, and the graph shows the mean as well as the 95% confidence intervals.
As can be seen in the figure, with an increase in the attack sending rates, the controller CPU load increases roughly linearly. In this scenario, the attacker is able to saturate the controller CPU with a rate of 10,000 pkts/s, which can be done with relatively modest effort. The attacker can achieve the same impact with a much lower attack rate, by adding multiple forward actions to the action list of the OpenFlow Packet-Out messages. For example, if each OpenFlow Packet-Out message contains 100 forward actions, the impact is multiplied by a factor of 100. This amplification potentially allows attackers with relatively minimal computing resources and bandwidth to saturate high-powered controllers. As mentioned, the attack can equally be launched from any of the hosts.
C. PING OF DEATH
Using fuzz testing, we also found that a single malformed message can crash FlowVisor. We refer to this attack as 'Ping of Death'. The result of this is quite severe since the entire network is disabled.
For the attack, we create an LLDP packet with the format shown in Figure 4 , but with simply omitting the trailer. For the demonstration and evaluation of the attack, we used our standard experimental scenario.
The attack can be generated either from the tenant controller or any of the hosts. For this experiment, we assume that the attack is initiated from Virtual Network 2 (Tenant 2), and is generated via our controller component running as the tenant controller of Virtual Network 2.
Since the impact of this attack is only on FlowVisor, there is no need to consider different SDN controller platforms for Virtual Network 1. In this scenario, we used ONOS as the tenant controller of Virtual Network 1. The controller C1 injects the attack LLDP packet, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message, and forwards it to the switch. FlowVisor intercepts the packet and parses the packet header.
As a result, FlowVisor immediately throws an exception and shuts down, as shown in the FlowVisor log messages in Figure 8 . Since FlowVisor represents a single point of failure, the entire network is taken down as a result, with potentially severe consequences.
We found this vulnerability using fuzz testing with a relatively small effort. It is likely that more extensive investigation would reveal further bugs and vulnerabilities. Our example highlights the importance of secure coding practices for critical network infrastructure services such as hypervisors in SDN.
VII. SECURITY OF OPENVIRTEX (OVX)
We conducted the same basic approach of analyzing the security of OVX as we did for FlowVisor. In the following, we discuss the results.
A. TOPOLOGY DISCOVERY
As in the case of FlowVisor, OVX utilizes OFDP to discover the underlying physical topology to build its own topology database. Based on that information, and information about the various virtual network configurations, OVX presents the corresponding virtual network topology information to the various tenant SDN controllers.
As in the case of FlowVisor, OVX achieves this by intercepting all LLDP packets sent by tenant controllers' topology discovery services, and creates the corresponding LLDP packets in reply, with the virtual topology information that it wants the tenant controllers to see. The format of the LLDP packets used in OVX is similar to the format used in FlowVisor, with only two additional Type Length Value (TLV) fields added, as shown in Figure 10 .
The first TLV field, OpenNetw1 TLV, carries the OpenVriteX name, while the second one, OpenNetw2 TLV, carries the Switch ID. Upon receiving an LLDP packet from a switch, OVX processes the packet and extracts the link information, i.e. Switch ID (the value specified in the OpenNetw2 TLV), and Port ID from the packet payload. The link information is then stored in the OVX database.
As mentioned previously, the current implementation of OFDP is insecure, and adding extra TLVs fields cannot protect topology discovery from the link spoofing attack. The attacker is still able to craft an LLDP packet that includes two additional TLV fields to deceive OVX and poison the topology information present in the OVX topology database.
We demonstrated the vulnerability of OVX against the topology poisoning or link fabrication attack via a simple experiment, via our standard experiment scenario also used for FlowVisor. For this, we created two virtual networks, Virtual Network 1 and Virtual Network 2. Similar to the FlowVisor case, the impact of this attack does not depend on the controller, and thus we only used ONOS as the controller in both virtual networks.
In this experiment, the attack is launched via host h2, which belongs Virtual Network 2 controlled by the malicious controller C1. Here, the attacker aims to fabricate a fake link from switch S1 on port P2, to switch S3 on port P2. The only difference in the attack steps to the FlowVisor case is that the OpenNetw1 field includes ''OpenVirteX '' and the OpenNetw2 field includes the sender switch ID, which in this case is the ID of switch S3. This makes the packet look like it was sent out on port P2 of switch S3. The packet is forwarded to the controller by switch S1, encapsulated in an OpenFlow Packet-Out message that includes the Chassis ID and the Port ID of switch S1. Upon receiving the packet, OVX extracts the link information and incorrectly updates its link database. Figure 9 shows the OVX topology database after launching the attack. 2 The highlighted line (in bold), which only appears after the attack is performed, indicates that there is a physical link from S3, P1 to S1, P2. This is incorrect and hence the attack was successful. As mentioned in the case of FlowVisor, poisoning the hypervisor topology database will also poison the topology view of all tenant controllers, with potentially wide ranging disruption of the network operation and packet forwarding.
B. BREAKING ISOLATION
As discussed in the previous section, OVX's topology discovery mechanism is vulnerable to the poisoning attacks, where an attacker can fabricate fake links. Here, we show how this can be exploited to break the isolation mechanism between two virtual networks. Using this attack, we can create a fake link between S1, P2 and S3, P1, using our standard scenario. We use the fact that tenant controllers build their topology database based on the (poisoned) topology information provided by OVX, thereby including the fake link between S1, P2 and S3, P1.
While this does not allow us to inject traffic from one network to another, as was the case in FlowVisor, it still allows the attacker h2 to passively observe traffic from Virtual Network 2, traversing through the fake link. In order to achieve this, the attacking host h2 simply needs to be disconnected from its network, and its interface needs to be set to promiscuous mode since OVX does not allow any host to capture network traffic from another virtual network to which the host does not belong to. To show the ability to break the isolation and intercept network packets, we established a TCP connection between hosts h1 and h5, both belonging to Virtual Network 1.
In parallel, we ran netcat [37] on the attacker h2, which is part of Virtual Network 2, to collect network traffic transmitted between hosts h1 and h5. As a result, all packets from host h1 destined to host h5 pass through host h2, as shown in the first two lines of Figure 11 . We also ran ping between the hosts, and the corresponding ICMP packets were also seen by host h2, as shown in the last 7 lines of the figure.
C. PING OF DEATH
Similar to FlowVisor, OVX is vulnerable to a 'Ping of Death' attack, in which a single malformed LLDP packet results in a fatal system error, i.e. a system crash that completely stopped OVX, and hence bringing down the entire network. As before, we found this vulnerability using fuzz testing.
OVX expects all LLDP packets to include a Switch ID field in the OpenNetw2 TLV with the ID of a valid switch. If the Switch ID field is set to a value other than one of the existing switches in the network, it will force OVX to restart, which causes all network configuration to be lost, as shown in Figure 12 . The consequences of this are essentially the same as a system crash.
In essence, these software bugs are due to relatively common coding errors, such as a failure to properly parse received packets, which should be caught by thorough code review and testing. The impact of these vulnerabilities can be extremely severe. OVX, for example, is part of the ONOS controller platform, which is a 'carrier-grade' SDN controller and is widely used in large-scale networks [22] . Being able to disable such a network via the sending of a single message is definitively a problem. This work hopefully provides the motivation for a more thorough code analysis and testing of key SDN infrastructure components such as network hypervisors.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Network virtualization is an essential service in SDN, and it provides a number of key benefits. Given their critical position in the SDN architecture, representing a single point of failure, the security analysis of SDN hypervisors is critical for the security and reliability of SDN in general. In this paper, we provided the results of our security analysis of FlowVisor and OVX, the two most widely used SDN hypervisor platforms.
Our analysis found a number of new vulnerabilities in both FlowVisor and OVX, which allow an attacker to significantly disrupt or disable networks, as demonstrated in our experiments.
Given the increasingly critical role SDN hypervisors in large-scale networks, our findings provide an important motivation for a more careful testing and analysis of hypervisor code, prior to deployment in production systems.
